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NEPAL'S ROYAL COUP: MAKING A BAD SITUATION WORSE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On 1 February 2005, in a move not only destructive of 
democracy and human rights but likely to strengthen 
the Maoist insurgents and make Nepal's civil war even 
more intense, King Gyanendra sacked Prime Minister 
Sher Bahadur Deuba, took power directly and declared 
a state of emergency.1 Gyanendra, who has dismissed 
three governments since 2002, claimed he was acting 
to "defend multiparty democracy". But his move had 
every familiar and indefensible coup ingredient: party 
leaders were put under house arrest, key constitutional 
rights were suspended, soldiers enforced complete 
censorship, and communications were cut.  
In a televised statement, Gyanendra blamed the 
politicians, saying they had discredited multiparty 
democracy by "focusing solely on power politics". 
Warning that the country was threatened by "terrorists", 
he said the security forces would end the nine-year-old 
Maoist insurgency in which 11,000 people have died. 
Prime Minister Deuba was placed under house arrest, 
and other political leaders, including the heads of party 
student wings, were detained before the announcement.  
Gyanendra's move was widely condemned by the 
international community. India, caught off-guard by the 
announcement, called it "a serious setback to the cause 
of democracy". UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
called for an immediate restoration of democracy, as did 
the British and U.S. governments.  
The king's takeover came as political tensions were 
building in Kathmandu over possible elections. Prime 
Minister Deuba had said that he would shortly announce 
a date for polls but this was greeted with considerable 
scepticism given the worsening security situation, in 
which the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist 
Leninist, UML), a member of Deuba's government, had 
 
 
1 This report provides the essential background to the royal 
coup of 1 February 2005, describes first consequences on the 
ground and reactions in Nepal and abroad, and offers initial 
analysis of its implications. Crisis Group will shortly provide 
additional analysis and policy recommendations for a way 
forward, as well as fuller discussion of related political 
subjects including the constitutional crisis. 
said it did not support holding an election. The main 
Nepali Congress Party had said it favoured restoration of 
the parliament elected in 1999 and would not take part 
in new polls. 
Dismissal of that parliament in October 2002 began 
the current political crisis. Gyanendra subsequently 
dismissed a royalist government he had hand picked and 
brought most of the mainstream political parties back 
into power. But Deuba was unable to return the Maoists 
to peace talks, and his coalition government was deeply 
split over how to proceed. With neither the political 
parties nor the king contributing constructively to the 
process, little progress was being made in developing the 
united multiparty democracy/constitutional monarchy 
front that most observers have seen as a necessary 
condition for any such talks to be productive.  
The last round of peace talks broke down in August 
2003, leading to intensified conflict. A significant 
build-up of government forces has done little to 
improve security across the country. Maoist 
insurgents, who have shown themselves able to attack 
at will, hold sway over most rural areas and are 
increasingly active in towns nominally controlled by 
the government. Combining effective guerrilla tactics 
with violent intimidation and extortion, they have 
built up a nationwide presence, though one founded 
more on fear than popular support. 
The state has withdrawn from most rural areas. Its 
security forces, based in district headquarters and a few 
heavily fortified posts, are vulnerable and unable to 
protect the population. When they are attacked, their 
response has often been indiscriminate violence that 
further undermines civilian security. There is 
widespread agreement among knowledgeable observers 
both inside and outside the country that the insurgency 
cannot be defeated militarily, and any solution will 
require a mix of military and political strategies. So far 
both have been lacking, and there is every reason to 
believe that the situation will now get even worse with 
the king's assumption of full power:  
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? This move will only boost the Maoists by 
confirming their view of the monarch as opposing 
democracy; they may now seek to make common 
cause with the mainstream parties against the king.  
? The political parties, while diminished since the 
dissolution of parliament in 2002, retain 
considerable grass roots support: any solution 
that does not include them is likely to be 
opposed by many and would be unsustainable. 
? Government security forces presently lack the 
capacity to defeat the Maoists and cannot develop 
it any time soon. Troops are now occupied 
controlling politicians and journalists in 
Kathmandu rather than fighting the insurgents. 
Nepal's terrain, the self-sustaining nature of the 
insurgency and its lack of an external backer make 
it difficult to put pressure on the insurgents, and 
the arrest or killing of a few key Maoist leaders 
will not end the conflict.  
? King Gyanendra enjoys little popular support. 
Most Nepalis would prefer a constitutional 
monarchy but calls for a republic have become 
louder in the past two years. The king is now 
directly exposed to the problems of running the 
country: if he does not deliver peace quickly, his 
support will sink further. 
? A worsening of the human rights situation with 
the suspension of constitutional protections and 
an upsurge in violence will likely reduce the 
willingness of donors to fund the social and 
economic reforms that would necessarily be 
part of any political solution. 
? There is no reason to believe that rule by decree 
will mean that corruption and mismanagement 
will be any less prevalent than when Nepal was 
previously governed by an absolute monarchy 
from 1960 to 1991.  
Kathmandu/Brussels, 9 February 2005 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The conflict dates to 1996 when the Maoists2 began 
organising an insurgency in the mid-west of the 
country. Regarded as an isolated problem that could 
easily be controlled, it received little attention in 
Kathmandu until a series of violent police operations 
led to a widening of the conflict. By 2001, the revolt 
had spread considerably, and the army had become 
involved. In June 2001, King Birendra and eight other 
members of the royal family were murdered by the 
Crown Prince, Dipendra, and the late monarch's 
brother, Gyanendra, was crowned king.  
In May 2002 Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba 
asked the king to dissolve parliament and call 
elections.3 When the Maoists announced they would 
mobilise against the elections, Deuba requested the 
king to postpone the polls for a year. Accusing him of 
incompetence, the king dismissed Deuba and took on 
executive powers, governing through an appointed 
prime minister, Lokendra Chand, a long time loyalist 
of the monarchy, who was himself replaced in June 
2003 by Surya Bahadur Thapa. The new prime 
minister, another loyalist, was dismissed in June 2004, 
and Deuba was reappointed to lead a cabinet that 
included members of his own Nepali Congress (D) 
Party and the UML. The main Nepali Congress Party, 
headed by a former prime minister, Girija Prasad 
Koirala, stayed out of government.4 
Deuba made a negotiated settlement his priority, 
announced formation of a Peace Secretariat and 
convened a High-Level Peace Committee (HPC) of 
 
 
 
2 The Maoists are formally known as the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN (M). 
3 For more background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°50, 
Nepal Backgrounder, Ceasefire: Soft Landing or Strategic 
Pause?, 10 April 2003; Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°30, 
Nepal: Dangerous Plans for Village Militias, 17 February 
2004; Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°28, Nepal: Back to the 
Gun, 22 October 2003; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°57, 
Nepal: Obstacles to Peace, 17 June 2003. 
4 Nepali Congress (D) split from Nepali Congress in 2002 due 
to differences between Koirala and Deuba. Hereafter the two 
parties are referred to as Congress (D) and Congress. 
major party leaders. In September 2004 the HPC called 
for the Maoists to return to talks. But the Maoist 
leadership repeatedly said it would negotiate only with 
King Gyanendra, whom it regards as the real power. The 
party chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (commonly 
known as Prachanda), challenged Deuba to demonstrate 
his full authority or allow his "masters behind the 
curtain" to talk.5  
Koirala's Congress and three other parties stayed out of 
government and refused to join the Peace Committee, a 
body that soon proved to be ineffectual. Tensions were 
evident within the government from the start, with the 
UML eager to move towards talks, even pressing for a 
unilateral ceasefire. This was rejected by Deuba, who 
set a deadline of mid-January 2005 for the Maoists to 
agree to negotiate. The deadline came and went 
without any new response. Deuba announced he would 
shortly call elections, but he gave no timetable as his 
policy faced opposition both inside and outside the 
government. Few believed polls could be held other 
than in a handful of towns and district command bases. 
The UML has opposed new elections and consistently 
urged that priority be given to reaching a peace deal 
with the Maoists. Congress also opposed the idea, and 
Koirala repeatedly called for the parliament elected to a 
five-year term in 1999 that had not been completed to 
be reinstated instead. 
Tensions between the king and the government were 
mounting in December 2004 but when the monarch 
suggested he might take over executive powers, he was 
firmly warned against such a course by regional and 
Western governments, who took the view that the 
conflict could best be tackled by a united front of so-
called constitutional forces against the Maoists.6 
Gyanendra's contempt for the parties was evident in his 
1 February 2005 speech dismissing the government, 
which repeatedly referred to their corruption and abuse 
of power. Those close to the palace say he is nostalgic 
for the type of government his father created in 1960.7 
The Panchayat period, as this was known, had a highly 
 
5 Maoist press statement, 24 September 2004. 
6 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu and New Delhi, 
December 2004 and January 2005. 
7 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu January 2005. 
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centralised government with all power residing in the 
palace. Elections were held but there were no political 
parties or effective opposition. This ended in 1990 with 
the development of a democratic but loosely drafted 
constitution that provides for parties to contest 
elections but also gives the king more powers, 
particularly over the military, than is normal in a 
constitutional monarchy. King Birendra subsequently 
ruled as a constitutional monarch, though he tended to 
interfere from behind the walls of the Narayanhiti 
Palace. The present king has interpreted a loosely 
worded article in that document as giving him the right 
to take back full control.8 
 
8 Article 127 of the Constitution states: "Power to Remove 
Difficulties: If any difficulty arises in connection with the 
implementation of this Constitution, His Majesty may issue 
necessary orders to remove such difficulty and such orders 
shall be laid before parliament". The language is imprecise 
but the king has never laid any order before parliament. Rule 
without elections clearly goes against the spirit and language 
of the preamble of the Constitution that states (speaking in 
the royal voice): "We are convinced that the source of 
sovereign authority of the independent and sovereign Nepal 
is inherent in the people, and, therefore, we have from time 
to time, made known our desire to conduct the government 
of the country in consonance with the popular will". Crisis 
Group will deal with constitutional issues in Nepal in more 
detail in a forthcoming report. 
II. THE COUP 
Although rumours of a royal takeover had circulated for 
months, there appear to have been no advance signs of it 
happening when it did, and planning was clearly limited 
to a small group of palace and army officials. The coup 
began early in the morning with the detention of senior 
political leaders from all the mainstream parties, 
including those previously linked to the king. Several 
hundred politicians and student leaders have been 
rounded up and are being held under house arrest and 
at a number of locations, including police and army 
camps.9 State television and radio broadcast the king's 
announcement at 10:00 a.m., and over the next hour all 
telephone and internet communications were cut.10 
Flights were turned back from Kathmandu's international 
airport. 
The palace summoned newspaper editors to impose 
complete censorship. Soldiers occupied all media 
outlets and applied full control over all publications. 
All internet sites hosted in Nepal, including those 
operated by media companies and political parties, 
were cut. Private radio stations stopped broadcasting 
news, while papers were restricted to the king's 
statement and a few other reports. Journalists who were 
able to communicate with the outside world described 
a climate of intense fear, and there were concerns the 
military would extend its round-up to media workers 
and human rights activists. The only Nepali political 
internet site still functioning two days after the coup 
belonged to the Maoists.  
Kathmandu remained calm, with a limited military 
presence on the streets. Troops commandeered any light 
trucks that ventured out, so traffic declined but the city 
was more active than during the regular strikes (bandhs) 
called by political parties. The only demonstration was a 
small one in favour of the king's move. Armoured 
vehicles were posted throughout the city as a reminder 
of the military's power. Many people seemed indifferent 
to the crisis, reflecting a widespread disillusionment 
with politics and a tendency to hope that some sort of 
external intervention would solve the conflict.11 There 
were reports of protests outside Kathmandu, including 
 
 
9 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, February 2005. See 
also the unconfirmed list of detainees compiled by the 
Human Rights Organisation of Nepal (HURON). 
10 Landline telephone and internet services were only 
restored on 8 February, a week after the coup. Mobile 
telephone networks were still not working and reportedly 
would not be reopened soon. "Communications Restored in 
Nepal", BBC News (World Edition), 8 February 2005. 
11 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, February 2005.  
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one by students in Pokhara on 3 February that was 
violently dispersed by soldiers.12 
Gyanendra suspended key parts of the constitution when 
he declared a state of emergency.13 There are currently 
no effective constitutional limits to his powers, and all 
civil liberties have been suspended, in violation of 
Nepal's international commitments.14 In what he said 
was a step to "defend multiparty democracy" as part of a 
monarchical tradition against authoritarianism, the king 
has disbanded all aspects of a democratic state and 
created what is effectively military rule.  
The king appointed a ten-member Council of Ministers 
but not a prime minister because, he indicated, he would 
direct it.15 The Council is made up of Royal loyalists, 
many of them senior officials during the Panchayat 
period of absolute monarchy. It has absolute power, 
unfettered by any constitutional restraint, and can rule 
by decree. It issued a 21-point plan of action after its 
 
 
12 Randeep Ramesh, "For Nepal, a Brutal Return to a Feudal 
Past", The Guardian 5 February 2005. The first major protest 
against the royal takeover occurred on 3 February in Pokhara 
at the local Prithvinarayan Multiple Campus, a hotbed of 
student politics from which many leftist national-level student 
leaders have emerged. Students chanted slogans against the 
king and burned tires. The security forces responded by firing 
"teargas shells and some rounds into the air", according to the 
RNA spokesman, Brigadier General Dipak Gurung. 
13 The key rights that were suspended are: Article 12(2)a: 
Freedom of opinion and expression; Article 12(2)b: freedom 
to assemble peaceably and without arms; Article 12(2)c: 
Freedom to form unions and associations; Article 13(1): 
Press and publication rights ("No news item, article or any 
other reading material shall be censored"); Article 15: Right 
against preventive detention (This provision contains an 
exception where there is "a sufficient ground of existence of 
and immediate threat to the sovereignty, integrity or law and 
order situation"; its suspension suggests that the king wishes 
to be able to detain arbitrarily.); Article 16: Right to 
information; Article 22: Right to privacy; Article 23: Right 
to a constitutional remedy. 
14 Nepal is not believed to have informed the UN Human 
Rights Commission of the state of emergency as obliged by 
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, to 
which it is a party. Under the terms of that agreement, Nepal 
cannot simply abrogate all these rights, but can only reduce 
their scope proportionately (i.e., as required by the exigencies 
of the situation). Many of the first measures undertaken, such 
as the sweeping arrests of political and student leaders and 
the wholesale blackout of all press activities, are patently 
unlawful, even in an emergency. Nepal has also been in 
violation of its obligations under the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities by cutting 
communications used by foreign embassies. 
15 See Appendix B below for a list of Council members and 
their biographies.  
first meeting,16 which was chaired by the king. The 
focus was on anti-corruption measures, including the 
stripping from politicians of assets allegedly gained 
through corruption. 
On 6 February, Minister for Tourism and Culture 
Budhhiraj Bajracharya announced to reporters that the 
king would soon form a committee to negotiate with 
the Maoists. He did not elaborate and did not say 
whether the king himself would participate in the 
committee. 
 
16 The Council's first meeting was held on 2 February 2005 
but details were not released until 4 February 2005. 
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III. THE ARMED CONFLICT 
At the heart of the crisis is the Maoist insurgency, an 
uprising that seems anachronistic in the 21st century but 
has presented a shockingly effective challenge to a 
weak state that lacks a political response to the many 
problems of poverty and exclusion in Nepal. The 
insurgency has grown from a local affair in a handful 
of districts to a nationwide problem. Maoists are now 
active in almost all areas, and the state has mostly 
retreated to a few towns and district headquarters that 
have large military camps. The Maoists often have a 
considerable say in what goes on in towns, intimidating 
local government officials or causing them to flee, so 
that the insurgents exercise effective control of many 
state functions such as administration, law and 
education.17 The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) has 
shown very little ability to contain the conflict or 
reverse Maoist advances. It does next to nothing to 
provide security for civilians; indeed many people 
Crisis Group interviewed across Nepal said they were 
more concerned by violence from the state security 
forces than by the Maoists.18 
Civilians have suffered terribly. The Maoists use 
extreme violence and have much abused human rights. 
The military and police response has in turn been brutal 
and indiscriminate. Following the collapse of a seven-
month ceasefire in August 2003, the conflict descended 
into its bloodiest phase.19 A Nepali NGO, the Informal 
Sector Service Centre (INSEC), reliably estimated in 
early January 2005 that 10,985 people had been killed, 
7,175 by state security forces, 3,810 by the Maoists.20 
More than 6,000 of these deaths have been since 2002. 
Among those killed are 289 children. There are no 
reliable estimates of other casualties but the increased 
use of improvised explosive devices by the Maoists has 
brought greater risks for civilians. Nepal now tops 
Amnesty International's list of alleged disappearances, 
with 378 cases reported since fighting resumed, more 
than in the previous five years together.21 
There is a wide divergence of estimates of the numbers 
displaced by the conflict, but observers agree the 
depopulation of rural areas is a worrying trend. Young 
men in particular have migrated within Nepal, across the 
open border to India and further afield in search of jobs 
 
 
 
17 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, Pokhara, Baglung 
and Jhapa, January 2005. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See Crisis Group Briefing, Back to the Gun, op. cit. 
20 See INSEC web site at www.insec.org.np.  
21 Amnesty International press release, London. 30 August 
2004.  
and to escape the fighting. In 2002-2003, INSEC 
recorded 31,635 cases of displaced people.22 The 
National Human Rights Commission estimates that over 
34,300 people have been displaced from rural areas. 
Little progress has been made on ensuring protection of 
basic rights -- either of civilians or combatants -- despite 
repeated verbal commitments from both sides.23 
A. THE MAOISTS  
Maoist leader Prachanda issued an immediate 
condemnation of what he described as the 
implementation of "feudal autocracy".24 He called for 
RNA soldiers to defy the king's orders and for a two-day 
strike in Kathmandu, although media controls and the 
cutting of phone lines meant few people in the capital 
were aware of this. Despite their public condemnations, 
the Maoists are certain to be delighted by the king's 
move as it pits them much more directly against the 
monarch and removes the mainstream political parties 
from the game. The Maoists are likely to consolidate 
their position, build alliances with other forces including 
political parties in Nepal and India, and maintain 
pressure on the military with guerrilla attacks.  
Capabilities. In the past eighteen months, the Maoists 
have expanded into parts of the country, such as the 
eastern lowland Tarai and hill districts, which used to 
be relatively untouched. On 31 August 2004, they 
announced that their campaign was entering the 
"strategic offensive" phase, and since then they have 
stepped up activities. This was decided at a Central 
Committee plenum that reportedly took place in 
western Nepal that month. As a Maoist-supporting 
news service put it, "the stage is being set for a very 
big jump in the level of fighting in the war over who 
will hold political power in Nepal".25 
The plenum also announced plans to expand the 
"People's Liberation Army" to three divisions, made 
up of 29 battalions in nine brigades, including a new 
division to be deployed in the central region around 
Kathmandu. The CPN (M) further aims to raise a 
100,000-strong "people's militia".26 Independent 
 
22 INSEC web site. 
23 Sustained violations by both sides are documented in 
Human Right Watch's report, "Between a Rock and a Hard 
Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal's Civil War", 7 
October 2004. 
24 Statement from CPN (M) Central Committee. 1 February 
2005.  
25 "Revolutionary strategic offensive announced in Nepal", A 
World to Win News Service, 13 September 2004 
(www.awtw.org). 
26 Ibid. 
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observers doubt such statements reflect ground 
reality: "The Maoists speak of battalions and divisions 
but there is no sign that they really have this many 
armed cadres", observes a Western security analyst.27 
Official estimates still place core Maoist fighters in 
the low thousands but there is no reason to doubt the 
determination to step up the military offensive, 
whatever their exact resources. 
Command and Control. While the Maoists have been 
playing by a standard guerrilla rule book, some of 
their activities raise more questions than they answer. 
Observers wonder what their goals are and often 
doubt whether they have a coherent plan or an 
effective command structure. Rumours of leadership 
disputes are compounded by questions over attempts 
at administration: does all the talk of alternative 
government translate into any meaningful action on 
the ground?28 How independent are the "autonomous 
governments" set up by the Maoists, and what do they 
do? And what is the Maoists' real position on 
development and international aid? 
The search for clear answers is hampered by the fact 
that Maoist commanders in different areas operate 
different policies and often claim great independence. 
Before jumping to the conclusion that this reflects a 
breakdown of discipline, it is worth recalling Mao's 
advice: 
In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently 
play the principal role, and there must be no excessive 
interference with their activities … In the case of 
guerrilla warfare, [centralised command] is not only 
undesirable but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units 
can coordinate their activities to any degree … there are 
no strictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it 
primarily characterised by the quality of co-operation of 
many units.29 
Nevertheless, Mao insisted on strictly disciplined 
adherence to overall political goals and warned that 
"unorganised guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to 
victory".30 In short, the flexibility allowed to local 
commanders is entirely permitted by classical Maoist 
strategy.  
"Our staff have encountered more than one local 
commander who has bluntly told them that whatever 
 
 
27 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 8 June 2004.  
28 Maoist administration will be the subject of a future Crisis 
Group briefing. 
29 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (1937), available at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/
guerrilla-warfare/. 
30 Ibid. 
the central policy, they feel no need to follow it -- they 
are the little emperors of their own small domains", 
observes one development worker.31 The Maoist 
leadership has admitted to some cases of indiscipline. 
For example, it apologised for the 16 August 2004 
killing of Dailekh-based journalist Dekendra Thapa, 
claiming it was an unauthorised action by local cadres. 
Such problems are compounded by the youth of local 
Maoist leaders and their frequent transfer, according to 
a UN official:  
It's not that we haven't had problems with the state 
security forces but there you can at least go to the 
relevant commander, and they will take effective 
action to rectify things. With the Maoists there's 
no one senior to complain to, and even when the 
leadership has announced decisions, we encounter 
local commanders who have either not heard 
them or refuse to recognise them.32  
Such inconsistency cannot simply be blamed on poor 
communications. "Certainly at the outset the Maoists 
faced huge problems of keeping in touch with cadres 
dispersed across difficult terrain", says a journalist with 
good contacts among both the rebels and the RNA. "But 
these days army officers are jealous of the Maoists' 
communications equipment -- even low-level commanders 
can be seen with mobiles and satphones".33 In certain 
areas the rebels have also published their own newspapers 
and run local FM radio, moves which should enhance 
the dissemination of central policy. 
The creation of regional "autonomous governments" 
along ethnic lines seems to have caused more serious 
political challenges to the unity of the movement. 
Unconfirmed reports from the August Central 
Committee plenum suggest there was heated debate 
over the degree to which these should submit to central 
control. The Tarai Liberation Front and Kirat Workers 
Party have publicly split from the CPN (M). But it is 
regional bodies that have recently been at the forefront 
of attempts to exert greater influence over development 
work. In Bardia district in the mid-western Tarai, the 
rebels have ordered NGOs and INGOs to register with 
the "new regime".  
"Obviously registering with the Maoists in any way 
whatsoever is completely out of the question", is a 
typical aid agency response.34 But the Maoists have 
sown some confusion. "The agencies subscribing to the 
basic operating guidelines know that in practice their 
 
31 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2004.  
32 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2004.  
33 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2004.  
34 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, July 2004.  
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local staff are constantly having to deal with Maoists", 
says a European humanitarian official. "It is impossible 
to pretend otherwise, however diplomatically convenient 
that may be".35 The European Union has generally been 
well received by the Maoists -- "a bit embarrassing", an 
EU official put it, "but not entirely negative: we can 
work in Maoist-affected areas".36 
Local NGOs have, nevertheless, had to deal with the 
Maoists more directly. In Bardia a representative 
committee sat down for several rounds of negotiations 
with leaders of the "regional government". "They're 
clearly trying to make a political point and insist that we 
recognise them formally as a force", said a spokesman. 
"But much of the discussion was very detailed and quite 
bureaucratic".37 Indeed, the Maoist position papers were 
prepared in standard official jargon and dealt in detail 
with topics such as recruitment procedures, clearance of 
project proposals and budget oversight. 
The most obvious effect of the expansion of Maoist 
activities, however, has been to draw even more 
civilians into the conflict. School teachers and students 
have been abducted -- thousands at a time -- to attend 
political camps.38 Although there are no reports of their 
being used in frontline fighting, the Maoists have also 
been giving military training to children in many of their 
base areas. The launch of a "strategic offensive" will 
probably lead to more violence in urban areas. 
Kathmandu and other towns are already becoming 
accustomed to frequent small explosions and shootings. 
Government-appointed local officials will continue to be 
threatened and killed. Aid projects will be disrupted and 
may have to be suspended. (Major bilateral agencies 
have halted activity in some western Tarai districts since 
early September 2004.) And the Maoists will seek to use 
the rhetorical threat of Indian expansionism and U.S. 
imperialism to recruit more fighters and further intensify 
their violent campaign. 
B. THE SECURITY FORCES 
The RNA has been much more closely involved in this 
coup than in earlier royal dismissals of governments. 
The belief is widespread in the capital that the military 
leadership pressed the king into taking this step. It has 
felt under growing pressure from critics of its human 
rights record and its failure to provide security for 
civilians in the face of the insurgency.  
 
 
35 Crisis Group interview, Brussels, July 2004.  
36 Crisis Group interview, Brussels, July 2004.  
37 Crisis Group interview, Gulariya, June 2004.  
38 Crisis Group interviews, Jhapa, Pokhara, Dankuta, Baglung, 
Kathmandu, January 2005. 
Troops moved rapidly to arrest political leaders and 
student activists in Kathmandu and elsewhere. Officers 
were stationed in all newspapers and broadcast media 
offices to control access to information. The king made 
it clear that he sought an expansion of the war against 
the Maoists unless they came to the table, although he 
did not say how this could be achieved. The RNA is 
likely to find itself increasingly burdened with 
maintaining law and order in cities. There are believed 
to be two army divisions in Kathmandu.39  
Capabilities. The RNA has expanded rapidly and has 
sought further increases in recruits and arms. Before it 
was first deployed to counter the insurgency in 2001, its 
strength was around 52,000 and its main experience in 
international peacekeeping operations abroad and 
ceremonial activities at home. Following rapid 
recruitment, it is at 78,000 and aims to reach 100,000.40 
The Ministry of Defence has submitted plans to the 
Ministry of Finance for the first step of expanding to 
85,000.41 Expansion has been accompanied by some 
restructuring: there are plans to post a brigade to each of 
Nepal's fourteen zones, with a divisional headquarters in 
each development region.42 Along with at least a 
division dedicated to securing the Kathmandu Valley, 
this would mean a total of six divisions, and possible 
even larger corps-level groupings.43  
Under the "unified command" structure introduced in 
November 2003, the RNA also directs the 15,000-strong 
Armed Police Force and the 46,500-strong Nepal Police 
in counter-insurgency operations. This hastened the 
withdrawal of police posts from many rural areas and 
encouraged consolidation in fewer, but better protected, 
bases. At the same time, former Prime Minister Surya 
Bahadur Thapa announced that civilian militias would be 
formed to defend villages. That flawed policy, however, 
was never widely implemented.44 Not counting other 
bodies such as the National Investigation Department, 
state security forces total approximately 140,000. 
Soldiers are equipped with a range of weapons, including 
self-loading rifles, Indian INSAS rifles and American M-
16s. The Air Service operates at least nineteen 
helicopters and seven fixed-wing aircraft, with further 
 
39 Crisis Group interviews, February 2005.  
40 Sitaram Baral and Sharad Adhikari, "Ghamasan tayari", 
Samay 17-23 September 2004. 
41 The Himalayan Times, 10 October 2004. 
42 Jane's Sentinel - South Asia, No. 12, 2003, and Jane's World 
Armies, June 2003, estimated RNA strength at five infantry 
brigades with fourteen to sixteen battalions. 
43 These plans were approved at a cabinet meeting on 6 July 
2004. Baral and Adhikari, op. cit. 
44 See Crisis Group Briefing, Dangerous Plans for Village 
Militias, op. cit. 
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advanced light helicopters promised by India.45 The 
government also plans to buy a fifth MI-17 helicopter.46  
C. TWO DIFFERENT WARS 
The intensification of military operations has been 
driven by very different strategic considerations and 
tactical techniques. In effect, the Maoists and the RNA 
are fighting two quite distinct campaigns. The Maoists 
are following a guerrilla warfare plan in which territorial 
control is of minimal significance, while the state has 
devoted most of its resources to static defence of towns 
and key infrastructure. The Maoists claim that the 
"strategic balance" phase of their campaign has 
established them as the "new regime" in most of the 
countryside. This now demands their extension into 
urban areas, though not by direct military assault. 
The RNA points to the Maoists' inability to exert 
exclusive control over territory as evidence of inherent 
weakness. The major RNA advance into the insurgents' 
heartland of Rolpa in July 2004 was cited as a 
significant blow. But as a senior Indian security analyst 
points out, "the rebels are just following the most basic 
of Mao's military tenets --'when the enemy advances, 
retreat'".47 Boasts that the Maoists have been unable to 
overrun and hold any district headquarters are similarly 
dismissed by military experts as irrelevant.48 The 
conflicting Maoist and RNA assessments of their 
relative strengths have been characterised by one analyst 
as a "dichotomy of assertions that may turn this conflict 
into a never-ending struggle".49 
As long as the two sides are fighting different wars, is 
there any way of judging prospects? Much has been 
made of Maoist claims to control 80 per cent of Nepal's 
area but such "control" is clearly not exclusive. There 
are no frontlines, and the RNA's repeated assertions that 
there are no "no-go" areas for its soldiers are true. But 
no one can deny that the rebels have become stronger 
and the state's political disarray has helped them. 
Without clear political will and planning, it is not 
surprising that the military response has been confused. 
 
 
45 The light helicopters are to be unarmed and used for troop 
transport. The RNA's only helicopter gunships are four 
Lancers. The exact nature of military aid was not specified in 
the joint press statement issued by the Indian and Nepali 
governments on 12 September 2004. 
46 The Himalayan Times, 24 September 2004. 
47 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, September 2004.  
48 Crisis Group interviews, Delhi and Kathmandu, September 
2004.  
49 Nishchal Pandey, "The Crisis in Nepal", Institute of Peace 
and Conflict Studies, Issue Brief No. 26, New Delhi, September 
2004. 
As Nepali foreign policy and security analyst Nischal 
Pandey observes: 
Maoists have emerged today as an alternative to the state. 
They have re-grouped and strengthened their position 
with each round of peace negotiations. Even with more 
than 10,000 people killed, there is no immediate 
likelihood of any durable breakthrough in the foreseeable 
future either militarily or through a peaceful dialogue … 
the fight against terrorism requires sustained, coordinated 
effort at all levels, a high moral position in which to 
continue the campaign and enhanced intelligence and 
logistical capability -- a step ahead of the rebels. 
Somewhere, somehow the national will went missing in 
the conundrum of the power struggle among the different 
constitutional forces in the country.50 
Although it has not been a major feature of their 
campaign, the Maoists have launched occasional large 
scale offensives. Early in 2004, attacks on the district 
headquarters of Bhojpur and Myagdi undermined RNA 
assertions that they had been fundamentally weakened. 
The 21 March 2004 assault on Beni, Myagdi's 
headquarters, was particularly damaging to the 
government's image. The Maoists were not wholly 
successful -- failing, for example, to overrun the army 
barracks -- but RNA protestations that they had fallen 
into a trap were met with incredulity. As a Western 
diplomat recalls, "At the start of the year there were 
still some who believed the army when it said the 
rebels had their backs to the wall. But Beni 
demonstrated clearly that the Maoists were still capable 
of mounting major attacks and coordinating thousands 
of fighters and supporters".51  
At the same time the insurgents have steadily increased 
use of other tactics, notably strikes, lengthy blockades 
and landmines or other improvised explosive devices. 
The killing of 22 armed police in a single landmine blast 
on the main highway in Banke district on 14 June 2004 
was shocking at the time but such attacks have been 
repeated with deadly regularity. For example, a 
landmine explosion and ambush on the Pokhara-
Baglung road in Parbat district on 26 January 2005 
claimed eight lives, including one civilian. 
The combination of unorthodox Maoist tactics and 
confident proclamations from senior RNA officers has 
confused many analysts. The blockade of the 
Kathmandu Valley in late August 2004 was met with 
bafflement but illustrated key features of the conflict. 
This was a "blockade" enforced solely through 
intimidation: there were no significant physical attempts 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, July 2004.  
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to cut off roads nor any notable deployment of 
guerrillas.52 In a battle of perceptions, the power of 
Maoist threats was pitted against public faith in the 
state's ability to ensure security. The latter was initially 
found wanting but the calling off of the blockade was 
cited as a collapse of Maoist strength. However, even 
the most conservative military analysts fear that the state 
has yet to understand Maoist tactics and develop a viable 
counter. As a senior regional security expert put it: 
The Maoists are following a very simple but terribly 
effective manual. You only need to glance through 
Mao's writings on guerrilla strategy to realise that they 
are largely going by the book. And unfortunately we 
know that this is a proven formula. The government 
desperately needs to establish security on the ground, 
even if only in a few districts at first, and show that it 
can reintroduce order and get a functional civil 
administration back up and running. This is the only 
way to regain the initiative and to restore faith in the 
state. But just now I fear that the government doesn't 
have a plan at all.53 
Observers of all backgrounds voice such concerns 
repeatedly. "No matter how well India equips the 
Nepalese security forces, they are far away from being 
capable of dealing with the Maoists", writes S.D. Muni, 
the former ambassador widely recognised as India's 
leading academic authority on Nepal. "India's own 
experience in the northeast and in areas affected by 
Naxalite Maoist guerrillas is that military methods may, 
at best, help, but cannot deliver a solution to internal 
revolts and insurgencies".54 Lessons that could be 
learned from regional experiences of counter-insurgency 
do not seem to have sunk in at all. A retired Indian 
general with longstanding Nepal connections comments:  
"I'm still shocked by the incompetence of the 
RNA and by its dangerous tactics. For example, 
in this day and age we would never use 
helicopter gunships in counter-insurgency work -- 
helicopters for transport, sure, but this is a war 
that can only be fought on the ground level. 
Firing into jungles from a thousand feet up has 
no real military benefit and is bound to be 
counter-productive when innocent civilians end 
up as victims".55 
 
 
52 A shutdown of industrial targets was similarly enforced by 
the token bombing of the Soaltee Hotel and the threats of a 
new, Maoist-affiliated trade union. 
53 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, September 2004.  
54 S.D. Muni, "Political Pilgrimage in Search of Security", 
South Asia Intelligence Review 3 (9), 13 September 2004. 
55 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, September 2004.  
Most of those calling for a peaceful solution recognise 
that a military element to the state response is justified. 
But even the most sympathetic observers are alarmed by 
the failure of current tactics. Not only have the Maoists 
been allowed to extend their sphere of influence, but 
increased security operations have not made civilians 
feel any more secure. At a gathering of local journalists 
in Nepalgunj's bazaar -- including representatives of the 
mainstream dailies and the government media -- not a 
single person felt the military presence made them safer. 
A journalist observed: 
Here we have the RNA's divisional headquarters 
and large police and armed police forces. But just 
call out from the rooftop here and the Maoists 
will be there -- they're all around us, and the 
security forces can hardly protect themselves. As 
long as they sit cowering behind their barbed wire 
waiting to be attacked how are they going to 
make the public feel secure?56 
 
56 Crisis Group interview, Nepalgunj, June 2004.  
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IV. THE POLITICAL CONFLICT 
Political leaders were rounded up as the king took 
power and have not been able to make any public 
statements. Senior leaders are under house arrest while 
others have been held on military and police bases. The 
crackdown on communications and the media has 
meant the new government has so far been able to limit 
any protests by supporters of the political parties.  
A. THE PALACE 
Relations between the king and political parties have 
been troubled since Gyanendra took the throne. In his 
statement on 1 February, the monarch flayed the parties: 
Even when bloodshed, violence and devastation 
has pushed the country to the brink of destruction, 
those engaged in politics in the name of the country 
and the people continue to shut their eyes to their 
welfare. Tussles for power, abuse of authority on 
gaining power and unhealthy competition in 
fulfilling personal and communal interests at the 
expense of the nation and citizenry contributed to 
a further deterioration in the situation. 
Nepal's political parties do have a sorry record since the 
introduction of multi-party democracy in 1990. They 
have been based around personalities rather than 
policies, and leaders have been corrupt, seen as elitist 
and remote, and have failed to develop any mechanisms 
of internal democracy that might have allowed the 
parties to reform themselves. Political instability has 
been the norm: there were ten governments between 
1991 and 2002.  
Much of the blame for the current situation can be 
legitimately pinned on the parties but not all of it. 
Birendra and Gyanendra constantly interfered in politics 
from behind the scenes, creating a tendency for political 
leaders to look upwards to the palace rather than 
worrying about popular support for policies. The 
previous king's heavy hand in shaping the 1990 
constitution has meant that civilians have never 
controlled the military. Gyanendra's dismissal of three 
governments since 2002 has only worsened the situation.  
The king has long been known to favour what might be 
called "The Musharraf Option" -- the idea that 
government might be best run by one man with only the 
thinnest veneer of democracy.57 While this has hardly 
 
 
 
57 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, January 2005. 
been the success that many claim in Pakistan itself,58 in 
Nepal there is a widespread view that it is likely to be a 
complete disaster:59 
? The RNA lacks the capacity to maintain military 
rule and wage a successful campaign against the 
Maoists. It could never be the alternative state 
that the military has become in Pakistan. The 
campaign against the Maoists is likely to be 
further weakened if the RNA's most competent 
officers are occupied in Kathmandu guarding 
political prisoners and censoring the media. 
? Political parties still have considerable support. 
Despite much frustration over their behaviour, 
about a third of Nepalis maintain an affiliation 
with a party.60 Recent polls indicate that 60 per 
 
58 See Crisis Group reporting on Pakistan including Crisis 
Group Asia Briefing N°12, Pakistan: The Dangers of 
Conventional Wisdom, 12 March 2002; Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°36, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, 
29 July 2002; Crisis Group Asia Report, N°40, Pakistan: 
Transition to Democracy?, 3 October 2002; Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°49, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, 20 
March 2003; Crisis Group Asia Report N°73, Unfulfilled 
Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism, 16 January 
2004; Crisis Group Asia Report N°77, Devolution in Pakistan: 
Reform or Regression?, 22 March 2004; Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°84, Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector, 7 
October 2004; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°86, Building 
Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 9 November 2004. 
59 See, for example, a commentary circulated by prominent 
Nepali editor Kanak Mani Dixit: "In castigating the political 
parties, King Gyanendra preferred to hark back to the 
Parliament dissolved three years ago, while keeping silent 
over [the] interim period and rule through palace-appointed 
prime ministers. This is the period when the peace and 
security of the country's populace plummeted more than 
previously". Kanak Mani Dixit, "Royal Takeover in Nepal: 
Drastic and Ill-Advised", circulated on the International 
Nepal Solidarity Network website at www.insn.org. 
60 A recent nationwide survey concluded that more than 28 per 
cent of people were not afraid to say they were close to a 
mainstream political party, in spite of continuing Maoist 
violence and intimidation, Crisis Group interview with Krishna 
Hachhethu, Kathmandu, 4 October 2004. This poll, which 
involved 3,249 respondents interviewed from 6 August 2004 to 
20 September 2004 in 31 urban and 132 rural areas, found that 
two thirds of Nepalis believed that "democracy is preferable to 
any other form of government" and three quarters believed 
"democracy is suitable in Nepal". Another poll found 41 per 
cent of respondents willing to affiliate with a mainstream 
political party, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., "Faith 
in Democracy Endures, In Spite of Disappointments: Report on 
the Baseline Survey and Focus Groups", Washington, 16 
August 2004, p. 6.. The methodology of this poll has not been 
published. 
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cent consider a democracy under a constitutional 
monarchy the best form of government.61 
? Even if talks are held between the Maoists and 
the king, no agreement negotiated without the 
support of the mainstream political parties is 
likely to endure. 
? Peace is unlikely without a broad national consensus 
on the problems of poverty, ethnic and caste 
exclusion and corruption that plague the country 
and fuel the conflict. This is unlikely to develop 
if the political stage is occupied only by the far 
left Maoists and the right-wing monarchists, who 
are drawn from the upper echelons of Nepal's elite, 
a group that has been conspicuously unresponsive 
to social issues in the past. 
? Coming to the throne unexpectedly in his 50s, the 
king has little political experience and few solid 
international connections. He lacks many high-
level contacts in Delhi or elsewhere and has 
shown little feel for diplomacy or governance. 
B. THE PARTIES 
Because the leadership of all the main parties -- the 
Congress of G.P. Koirala, the Congress (D) of ousted 
Prime Minister Deuba, the United-Marxist Leninists 
(UML) of Madhav Nepal and the Royalist RPP of 
former premier Lokhendra Chand -- is under arrest and 
communications have been restricted, there has been no 
coordinated response to the coup. However, statements 
made by, or on behalf of, the leaders of major parties 
have been smuggled out and communicated to the 
international press. Initial reports indicate that several 
hundred senior party figures are being detained. 
The main parties were widely divided before the coup. 
Congress (D), the UML and the RPP were part of the 
ousted government but Koirala's Congress remained 
aloof from the coalition and refused to support Deuba's 
call for elections, preferring reinstatement of the 
previous parliament. The political parties already were 
seriously weakened during the past two years, when the 
king wielded power from behind the scenes. They are 
very much centred on their leaders, particularly in both 
branches of Congress, and could be crippled if those 
leaders remain completely isolated. There are real risks 
of splits in all parties as some members try to work with 
 
 
61 A July 2004 nationwide poll found that 60 per cent of 
respondents favour a democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy; 17 per cent democracy without a monarchy; 9 
percent a return to the Panchayat system, and only 2 per cent 
an absolute monarchy, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research 
Inc., op. cit., p. 6.  
the king and military, and others oppose the coup. The 
UML has long-standing plans to go underground but 
these are unlikely to be fully implemented. 
The Maoists have already appealed for a united front of 
political forces against the king and army and are likely 
to pursue this, particularly with party officials outside of 
Kathmandu. While cadres of the UML, Congress and a 
small Marxist party, Janamorcha Nepal, have up to now 
been targets of Maoist violence, and many bitterly 
oppose any alliance with them,62 Nepali parties tend to 
be opportunistic rather than strongly ideological, so 
some improbable alliances are possible. If alliances do 
emerge, they probably will end up being led by the 
Maoists, who are now the only well-organised, 
disciplined political force in the country.63  
Middle ranking politicians are apprehensive of the 
Maoist call for a united front. "We have been their 
primary target all along. How can we trust them now?" 
asked a Congress leader. But other Congress politicians 
have already been quoted as urging the Maoists to join 
them in opposing the king and refusing talks. The UML 
also views the rebels with suspicion. One UML 
functionary said that an alliance with the Maoists is 
out of the question at least in the near future -- "but if 
they renounce violence against the parties, then some 
sort of ideological alliance cannot be ruled out".64 
The senior leadership of the Congress parties and the 
UML have accepted the concept of a constitutional 
monarchy up to now but calls for a republic have been 
growing among the student wings of the parties for 
two years. Republicanism -- once a taboo -- is now 
likely to feature in discussions in all the parties.  
Reports appeared in the newly controlled Nepali press 
on 4 February that the king would display the wealth 
of political leaders -- private property is no longer 
protected after suspension of parts of the constitution 
-- in order to discredit them. Corruption charges are 
likely to be used to continue detention of politicians. 
Corruption is certainly a huge national problem but 
politically motivated prosecutions would do nothing 
to cure it. The palace and the military are no less 
corrupt than any party and have never been subject to 
democratic oversight. 
 
62 Crisis Group interviews with party cadres, Baglung, January 
2005. 
63 There is constant talk in Kathmandu about splits in the 
Maoist movement. There surely are some differences in policy 
but much of this talk is wishful thinking. For nine years, the 
Maoists have consistently shown themselves to be the most 
disciplined, least divided force in Nepal.  
64 Crisis Group interviews. Kathmandu. February 2005. 
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE  
The king's coup clearly caught the international community 
by surprise. The main countries involved in Nepal 
believed they had headed off such a move in December 
2004 by strongly warning the monarch against taking 
absolute power and were reasonably confident -- if not 
certain -- that he would stop short of such a step. 
Immediate reaction was almost universally one of dismay, 
with many diplomats and analysts warning that the 
move would only boost the Maoists and undermine the 
monarchy. 
A. INDIA 
The Indian government, with the most direct interests 
and influence in Nepal, was completely unaware of the 
king's move. Its initial reaction has been strong: first a 
sharply critical statement65 and then cancellation of the 
visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Dhaka for a 
summit of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) that King Gyanendra had said he 
would attend. The army chief, General J.J. Singh, turned 
down an invitation to Kathmandu. A potentially 
crippling freeze on military assistance has been reported 
in the Indian press.66 Nepal is deeply reliant on India in 
every sphere, and the king has taken a serious gamble in 
annoying New Delhi.  
India was clearly shocked that the king flouted its 
advice so openly and undiplomatically. A senior Indian 
analyst with close contacts in both capitals said:  
People in Delhi are angry, very, very angry. The 
last time Nepal went against India so openly was 
under the Ranas in the 1950s and look what 
happened to them…the king has deliberately gone 
against clear advice. By doing this he has made 
India, if not an enemy, then an opponent.67  
"We have always made clear our belief that constitutional 
monarchy and multiparty democracy are the twin pillars 
of the state of Nepal", a senior Indian Ministry of 
 
 
 
65 Ministry of External Affairs, "Statement on Developments 
in Nepal", 1 February 2005. 
66 "India to suspend military aid to Nepal but rejects direct 
army intervention", South Asia Tribune, 7 February 2005. 
67 Crisis Group interview, February 2005. The Ranas, 
hereditary prime ministers who ruled Nepal while keeping 
the Royal Family in a subservient position, were forced from 
power, in part by Indian pressure. Indian economic and 
political pressure also played a role in the democracy 
movement in 1990. 
External Affairs officer affirmed just days before the 
coup. "We have consistently urged the palace and the 
parties to work together to confront the Maoist threat".68 
India's foreign secretary and former ambassador to 
Nepal, Shyam Saran, has often reiterated the established 
policy: 
India has publicly stated that we do not believe 
that a purely military solution is possible to this 
problem and that [a] peaceful solution should be 
pursued. The question is what really are we 
looking at in terms of the peace solution? Our 
view is that the pursuit of any political objective 
through violence is something that we do not 
accept. We have also stated that any pursuit of a 
peace settlement must be within the parameters 
of the preservation of multiparty democracy in 
Nepal and also within the parameters of 
constitutional monarchy.69 
King Gyanandra's willingness to go so directly against 
New Delhi's advice is all the more surprising because 
the Indians were becoming increasingly concerned 
about the impact of the civil war and strongly supportive 
of the the Nepali government. That concern grew 
considerably in the second half of 2004. While there is 
no great unease about the Maoist political agenda as 
such, officials in New Delhi are increasingly 
preoccupied at the prospect that an armed insurgency 
might overthrow a neighbouring government.  
The developing perception that Maoist links with Indian 
insurgent groups threaten domestic security has also 
inevitably generated some anxiety. The Indian Ministry 
of Home Affairs has expressed concern that the Maoists 
are collaborating with the Communist Party of India 
Marxist-Leninist (People's War), or CPML-PW, and the 
Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC-I) to 
coordinate an extensive insurgency: 
The prime motive behind the expansionist designs 
of CPML-PW and MCC-I together with the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is to spread 
into new areas to carve out a "Compact 
Revolutionary Zone" spreading from Nepal 
through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to 
Andhra Pradesh.70 
Officials describe a "symbiotic relationship" between 
the CPN (M) and home-grown Naxalite groups and 
 
68 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, 28 January 2004.  
69 Media briefing, Ministry of External Affairs, 10 September 
2004. Transcript at http://meaindia.nic.in/pressbriefing/2004/ 
09/10pb02.htm. 
70 Ministry of Home Affairs, "Annual Report 2003–2004", 
p. 41. 
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claim the MCC-I has provided the Maoists with arms, 
shelter, manpower and military training.71 News reports 
claimed some of the 1,000 submachine guns and 150 
rocket launchers intercepted in the Bangladeshi port of 
Chittagong in April 2004 might have been heading to 
Nepal.72 Since the unification of India's Maoist parties 
under the banner of the Communist Party of India 
(Maoist) on 14 October 2004 and the collapse of talks 
between the rebels and the Andhra Pradesh government 
on 17 January 2005, these concerns have fuelled further 
headlines. 
Several Maoist leaders have been detained in India. 
At the end of March 2004, senior ideologue Mohan 
Baidya was arrested near Siliguri in north Bengal and 
charged with offences against the state. Reports of his 
interrogation have been used to claim further links 
between the CPN (M) and north eastern groups and 
attempts to exploit Indian territory. A senior civil 
servant said, "we now know that Mohan Baidya was 
not only organising among Indian Nepalis but also 
negotiating arms deals with ULFA [United Liberation 
Front of Asom]".73 
There are some less alarmist assessments of the nature 
and extent of these links. "The so-called 'Compact 
Revolutionary Zone' seems to be the creation of Delhi 
security experts", observes a Kathmandu-based 
human rights worker. "The Maoists never speak of it, 
and there are no signs that it features high on their list 
of priorities".74 Indeed, the Maoists go out of their 
way to mock it as "a figment of imagination by some 
journalists (or intelligence agencies?)".75 The 
solidarity of Maoist and Naxalite movements is also 
fragile despite a loose coordinating committee. A 
veteran Kolkata-based and above-ground Naxalite 
says, "The MCC and PW have a history of internecine 
warfare, and there are plenty among them who have 
little sympathy for Nepal's Maoists. The only thing 
we can be sure of is that if the CPN (M) ever came to 
power, the first thing it would do would be to sever 
any links with Indian revolutionaries".76  
Others are more directly critical of the CPN (M). "The 
Nepali Maoists are on the wrong track", insisted a 
Siliguri-based leader of a legal Naxalite party. "They 
must realise that their current campaign of violence will 
 
 71 Ibid, p. 42. 
72 See, for example, Haroon Habib, "A deadly cargo", 
Frontline Magazine, 8 May 2004.  
73 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, July 2004.  
74 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2004.  
75 The Worker, Organ of the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), No. 9, February 2004, p. 66. 
76 Crisis Group interview, Kolkata, June 2004.  
not achieve their stated goals".77 Sceptical Maoist 
sympathisers add, "there is a long history of bad blood 
between ULFA and Nepali political groups. After all, 
ULFA was only allowed to set up camps in southern 
Bhutan on the understanding that it would wipe out the 
last remnants of Nepali democratic and communist 
movements".78 
Nevertheless, concern in New Delhi is palpable. Security 
along the open border has been strengthened by 
deployment of armed Special Security Bureau/Sashastra 
Seema Bal (SSB) battalions.79 Maoist Central Committee 
members Matrika Prasad Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar 
were arrested in February 2004 and handed over to 
Nepali authorities before their detention became public. 
Indian human rights activists allege the summary 
extradition was illegal; their whereabouts in Nepal have 
not been revealed.  
On 21 September 2004 a meeting in Hyderabad of 
representatives of Naxalite-affected states chaired by 
Home Minister Shiva Raj Patil decided to reinforce 
border security arrangements.80 Cooperation has been 
facilitated locally. For example, on 23 September 
security and administration officials from neighbouring 
Indian and Nepali districts in Uttaranchal state formed a 
joint security task force. Heightened border security and 
further efforts to arrest Nepali Maoists are likely to 
remain prominent features of Indian central and state 
government responses.  
India has been concerned about the involvement of other 
powers in the conflict, rejecting any efforts at third party 
mediation and even raising concerns about some 
military aid. Under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship, Nepal must seek Indian authorisation to 
import weapons from a third country, and Delhi has 
traditionally seen itself as almost the sole source of the 
country's arms. While it eventually approved the U.S. 
grant of 20,000 M-16 rifles, independent military 
analysts are critical. "M-16s are very dangerous, fully 
automatic weapons that are simply not appropriate for 
internal counter-insurgency operations", cautions a 
retired general. "Poorly trained young recruits will be 
encouraged to spray more bullets around, while the 
worry for us is that these guns will rapidly find their way 
into the hands of the Maoists and then onto the Indian 
illegal arms market".81 Indian military assistance has 
 
77 Crisis Group interview, Siliguri, April 2004.  
78 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, September 2004.  
79 These are forces controlled by the Home Ministry that 
handle border security issues. 
80 Kantipur, 22 September 2004. 
81 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, September 2004.  
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included its own standard-issue INSAS rifle, mine-
protected vehicles and helicopters. 
The king's coup has sharpened India's worries about 
Nepal. The question now is whether it will conclude 
that despite its unhappiness with Gyanendra's actions, 
it has no viable option other than to support him -- or 
whether it will use some of the levers it controls to 
press him to retreat.  
B. THE U.S. 
The U.S. government expressed concern through the 
State Department's spokesman but refrained from a 
higher-level condemnation of the king's move. The king 
made a blatant appeal to U.S. preoccupations in his 
announcement by repeatedly mentioning terrorism. U.S. 
anxieties have centred around fears of a Maoist victory 
and what that might mean for the people of Nepal, and 
Washington's statement emphasised that the king's action 
"will undermine the Nepali struggle with the Maoist 
insurgency, a very serious challenge to a peaceful and 
prosperous future for Nepal".82 Policymakers have 
frequently raised concerns that, should they achieve 
power, the Maoists might behave in the extremely 
violent manner of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.83 
Although the Maoists have been very violent, there is 
little suggestion they plan a Khmer Rouge-style "Year 
Zero".84 During the 2003 ceasefire, the U.S. designated 
the CPN (M) a supporter of terrorism.85 On 31 October 
2003, it announced it was freezing Maoist assets for 
national security reasons.86 These measures bar almost all 
dealings with the CPN (M) or its members. 
 
 82 Richard Boucher, "Statement on Dismissal of Government 
and State of Emergency in Nepal", U.S. Department of State, 
1 February 2005. By contrast, the statement of the European 
Union (see below) emphasised that there is no military 
solution to the conflict, and negotiations are needed with the 
insurgents. The U.S. statement called for the Maoists "to 
abandon their armed struggle and to join the political 
mainstream through dialogue". 
83 For more background on U.S. responses to the conflict, 
see Crisis Group Report, Nepal Backgrounder, op. cit.  
84 Nepali Maoists have exhibited great flexibility on many 
ideological points, often saying, for example, they accept 
that Nepal is not ready for socialism and must "complete the 
bourgeois democratic revolution" first. In areas under their 
sway, they have introduced few controls over the economy, 
preferring to allow people to run businesses while they extort 
money from them to finance their fight.  
85 Executive Order (EO) 13224; see U.S. Department of 
State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism", 2003. 
86 Congressional Research Service, "Terrorism in South 
Asia", updated 9 August 2004. 
The bombing of the American Center in Kathmandu on 
10 September 2004 -- although not claimed by the 
Maoists -- drew the U.S. deeper into the situation. While 
reiterating its commitment to a peaceful solution to the 
insurgency, the U.S. gave an additional $1 million in 
security assistance, announced its intention to seek 
additional funding for the fiscal year beginning 1 
October 2004 and suspended the Peace Corps program. 
It subsequently approved $2.2 million in military aid and 
$40 million in economic aid .87  
The U.S. has given significant military aid to Nepal, 
including weapons and training -- more than $20 million 
worth since 2002, with some anticipation that a much 
larger budget request of around $24 million will be 
made for fiscal year 2006.88 There is much scepticism 
about the effectiveness of this assistance given the 
RNA's performance and the worsening human rights 
abuses carried out by the armed forces.89 "Of course the 
RNA needs to be effectively armed", says a senior 
security analyst. "But it needs cheap, sustainable, local 
solutions rather than an injection of high-tech weaponry 
that it will find hard to deploy and which will only raise 
the stakes in the fighting".90 U.S. officials dismiss such 
doubts. "The M-16 is a proven weapon which any 
soldier in the world would be glad to use", insists a 
senior diplomat. "Nepali soldiers deserve to be decently 
armed to fight the Maoists, and of 15,000 rifles supplied 
so far they have only lost one".91 
Given this history of growing support for the 
government's counter-insurgency activities and the 
relatively low key manner in which the U.S. reacted to 
the coup, there is speculation in Kathmandu that the 
king may have given its embassy advance word of his 
intentions.92 Washington's actions in the coming weeks 
will be watched carefully for clues. Several senators 
 
87 U.S. embassy press release, Kathmandu, 13 September 
2004. More than 4,000 volunteers have served in the Peace 
Corps program in its 42-year history. 
88 Most of the assistance comes under four programs: Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) that provides for equipment 
including weapons; Enhanced International Peacekeeping 
Capabilities (EIPC) that trains peacekeepers for operations 
outside Nepal; International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) for training; and Joint Combined Exchange Training 
(JCET). 
89 The U.S. has consistently claimed that its assistance has 
helped the RNA reverse Maoist successes but this is belied 
by reports from outside Kathmandu where civilians report 
little military presence and a complete lack of security or 
state functions. Crisis Group interviews, Baglung, Pokhara, 
Kathmandu, Jhapa, January 2005. 
90 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, September 2004.  
91 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, July 2004.  
92 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, February 2005. 
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from both parties have issued their own statements of 
concern and begun to consider whether military 
assistance must be cut off under a provision of U.S. law 
that bars assistance to a government that has overthrown 
an elected head of government or should be restricted as 
a matter of policy. There is little doubt that much 
tougher conditionality than in the past will be added by 
Congress.93  
C. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHERS 
European Union. An EU statement expressed grave 
concern about the king's ending of multiparty 
democracy and urged the immediate release of those 
detained. It also emphasised that, "the EU firmly 
believes that a negotiated and democratically-based 
solution is the only acceptable and sustainable way to 
end the current conflict. The EU continues to judge 
that there can be no acceptable military solution to 
Nepal's problems and that any search for a solution by 
military means by either side will only add to and 
prolong the suffering of the Nepalese people".94 
For the past few years, concern has been rising among 
some EU member states that as the king undermined 
democracy, his government was being given too 
unconditional political support and too much military aid 
-- governance, human rights and accountability issues 
were forced to take a back seat to security issues even 
though most analysts were warning that there was no 
effective political and economic strategy to counter the 
Maoists. European diplomats have engaged with the 
Maoists in the field in order to ensure continuation of 
development projects. The EU and its member states 
give Nepal more than €100 million a year in assistance.95 
The EU has consistently urged negotiations between the 
Maoists and a multi-party government in Kathmandu. It 
has also expressed concerns about human rights abuses 
on both sides, a theme likely to be reemphasised in the 
present situation. 
The United Nations. Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
expressed concern in a statement issued immediately 
 
 
 
93 Section 508 of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act. See 
statements by Senator Richard Lugar (Republican), Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, 3 February 2005, and 
Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat), "A step backward in 
Nepal", 2 February 2005.  
94 "Declaration by the European Union on the royal takeover 
in Nepal", 2 February 2005. 
95 Press Release following an EU Troika visit to Kathmandu, 
15 December 2004. 
after the coup.96 UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Louise Arbour, who had visited Kathmandu 
shortly before the coup, issued a statement reminding 
the king of his pledges to respect human rights and 
warning that basic rights could not be suspended under 
any circumstances, "not even during a state of 
emergency".97 A group of nine UN human rights 
experts and special rapporteurs put out a joint 
statement calling on the king to respect basic rights.98 
The United Kingdom. The UK expressed "grave 
concerns",99 and the Nepali ambassador to London was 
summoned to the Foreign Office. Britain has a substantial 
array of security, aid and business links to Nepal and is 
unlikely to turn against the monarchy but the king's move 
runs against all advice offered over recent years and will 
no doubt inspire much frustration in Whitehall. The UK 
provides some non-lethal military assistance. Its military 
has long-established links with Nepali counterparts and 
has tended to downplay concerns about the RNA's 
behaviour and the extent of its likely support for a return 
to absolute monarchy.100 However, the Foreign Office 
statement explicitly noted that, "the British Government 
will have to assess the impact of this move on our 
security and developmental assistance".  
China. Beijing had no comment on the king's move 
beyond saying it was an internal affair. Coming shortly 
after the closing of the Dalai Lama's office in 
Kathmandu that provided relief services to Tibetan 
refugees -- Crown Prince Paras was pressed on the issue 
during a recent trip -- the suspicion has been raised that 
the king made some sort of deal with China.101 The mere 
suggestion of trying to play China and India off against 
each other would incense New Delhi and be extremely 
risky. In general the Chinese have stayed out of the 
conflict but they are clearly concerned about instability 
in Nepal and have a general preference for the monarchy 
over democratic rule. "So far the Chinese have indicated 
that they would be satisfied if we can use our influence 
to contain and resolve the conflict", a senior Indian 
diplomat observed, "but there can be little doubt that 
 
96 "Annan concerned about dismissal of government in 
Nepal", UN statement, New York, 1 February 2005. 
97 "High Commissioner for Human Rights Expresses Concern 
over Situation in Nepal", UNHCHR statement, Geneva, 1 
February 2005. 
98 "United Nations human rights experts express concern 
about situation in Nepal", UN statement, Geneva, 8 February 
2005. 
99 "Britain 'gravely concerned' by Nepal developments", Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office press release, 1 February 2005. 
100 Crisis Group interviews, London and Kathmandu, February 
2005. 
101 "Nepal closes Dalai Lama office in Kathmandu", Agence 
France-Presse, 28 January 2005. 
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they will not stand idly by if the situation deteriorates 
into complete instability".102  
Japan and other donors. Japan is a major aid donor 
but plays little political role in Nepal. Tokyo has 
called for a restoration of democracy and for the 
Maoists to negotiate a peace agreement. There has 
been little response from the International Financial 
Institutions. Two days after the takeover, the Asian 
Development Bank signed a 1.8 billion rupee ($26 
million) loan agreement with the government. 
 
102 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, July 2004.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
King Gyanendra has backed himself into a corner. 
Soldiers who should be fighting insurgents are acting as 
jailers for the country's democratic leadership. Political 
parties are now likely to line up against the monarchy. 
The people's clear preference to combine constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary democracy has been 
defied: if the king's dismissal of the government truly 
had popular support, it would not be necessary to 
imprison politicians, cut communications and censor the 
media. Nepal's friends, with India in the first rank, are 
increasingly anxious. Only those who want a return to 
an absolute monarchy, and the Maoists, are pleased. 
The Maoists stand to gain most from the king's move. 
They have long accused him of operating from 
"behind a curtain" but now he is out in front and a 
clearer political target. They have little incentive to 
negotiate at a time when the state is unravelling, and 
the constitutional forces are divided. They are also 
aware that the military can put little pressure on them 
and that they can cause considerable economic 
disruption by declaring blockades and strikes. Even if 
they were to come to the table, it is hard to see what 
sort of compromise could be reached between the 
opposite poles of Nepali politics without the help of 
the mainstream parties. 
Gyanendra has gambled that countries will be reluctant 
to cut support as long as the Maoists are a threat. But 
blindly supporting a monarch who undermines democracy 
will only aid the Maoists and do nothing to reduce the 
risk of them coming to power. A concerted effort to 
bring the constitutional forces together and develop a 
package of constitutional, social and economic reforms 
is the only way to regain some of the state's losses to the 
Maoists in recent years. The Maoists are unlikely to 
negotiate a peace agreement unless they are under some 
pressure. The only way to achieve that would be through 
effective military action that provides security for 
civilians and for the state to adopt a political strategy 
that undercuts their positions. Neither will be possible 
without a broad-based government in Kathmandu. But 
that is a prospect that has, for now, been destroyed by 
the 1 February royal coup. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 9 February 2005 
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APPENDIX B 
 
THE NEW COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
 
 
Ramesh Nath Pandey, Minister of Foreign Affairs -- 
Began career as a journalist. Was close to Congress 
leader B. P. Koirala when he was thrown in jail by 
King Mahendra in 1960. Koirala later accused him of 
being a spy for the king. Served as minister during the 
Panchayat period. Was appointed communication and 
information minister in the Chand cabinet by King 
Gyanendra after the Deuba government was dismissed 
in October 2002. Played a key role, along with 
cabinet colleague Narayan Singh Pun, in bringing the 
Maoists to the negotiating table in early 2003. 
Publicly fell out with Pun over those negotiations and 
was instrumental in causing the king to backtrack on a 
key provision of the ceasefire with the Maoists (the five-
kilometre perimeter agreement). Had a nervous 
breakdown and was hospitalised when the Chand 
government was sacked by the King in June 2003. 
Political affiliation: strong royalist and opportunist. 
Radha Krishna Mainali, Minister for Education and 
Sports -- One of the original Naxalite revolutionaries 
in the Jhapa uprsing of the early 1970s, he is also a 
founding member of the CPN-ML, now UML. 
Served as the public face of the ML during the 1990 
people's movement. Cabinet minister in the UML 
minority government, 1994-1995. Fell out with his 
party's general secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, and 
its leader, K. P. Oli, over the 1996 Mahakali River 
Treaty with India. Joined forces with his brother, C. P. 
Mainali, and Bamdev Gautam to split the UML in 
1998 and found the ML. Rejoined UML in 2002 
when the two parties reunited, but fell out with the 
party leadership in early 2004 for advocating a softer 
approach towards the king. Was expelled from the 
party in early 2004 as a result. 
Dan Bahadur Shahi, Home Minister -- Key 
functionary during the Panchayat, when he served 
progressively as chief district officer, zonal 
commissioner and Home Secretary. Not much heard 
of during the democracy years. Known to be aligned 
with ultra royalist Sharad Chandra Shah. 
Buddhiraj Bajracharya, Minister for Tourism and 
Culture -- UML background. Served as mayor of 
Patan on UML ticket, but switched to royal affiliation 
some years ago. 
Durga Shrestha, Minister for Women, Children and 
Social Welfare -- Hails from Tanahu district. Central 
Committee member of the royalist party, RPP. No 
previous experience in government. 
Tanka Dhakal, Minister for Information and 
Communication -- Entered politics during the 
Panchayat. Closely connected to Kamal Thapa and 
Sharad Chandra Shah. No previous experience in 
government. 
Madhukar Shumsher Rana, Minister of Finance -- 
Known as a development expert. Served in various 
donor agencies, including as advisor at the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) Nepal country office. 
Also served as advisor in the Foreign Ministry during 
the premierships of Chand and Thapa in the late 1990s.  
Ram Narayan Singh, Minister for Labour and 
Transport -- Hails from Saptari district in the Tarai. 
Known as a staunch royalist. 
Krishna Lal Thakali, Minister of General 
Administration -- Member of the ethnic minority 
Thakali community (a janjati group) but otherwise 
not much known about his background. 
Khadga Bahadur GC, Minister for Local 
Development -- Former communist leader co-opted 
by the Panchayat, during which period he served as a 
zonal commissioner.  
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an 
independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with 
over 100 staff members on five continents, working 
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to 
prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. 
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by 
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of 
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments 
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, 
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct 
regular update on the state of play in all the most 
significant situations of conflict or potential conflict 
around the world. 
Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in 
foreign ministries and international organisations and 
made available simultaneously on the website, 
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with 
governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board -- which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media -- is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of 
senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is 
co-chaired by Leslie H. Gelb, former President of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, and Lord Patten of Barnes, 
former European Commissioner for External Relations. 
President and Chief Executive since January 2000 is 
former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. 
Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, 
London and Moscow. The organisation currently 
operates nineteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, 
Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, 
Nairobi, Osh, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito, 
Sarajevo, Seoul, Skopje and Tbilisi), with analysts 
working in over 50 crisis-affected countries and 
territories across four continents. In Africa, this includes 
Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; 
in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, 
North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in 
Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole 
region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, 
Colombia, the Andean region and Haiti. 
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The 
following governmental departments and agencies 
currently provide funding: Agence Intergouvernementale 
de la francophonie, Australian Agency for International 
Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
Canadian International Development Agency, Czech 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International 
Development, Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, United Kingdom Department for International 
Development, U.S. Agency for International Development.  
Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic 
Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford 
Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William 
& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation 
Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John 
Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open 
Society Institute, David and Lucile Packard Foundation, 
Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace 
Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community 
Endowment Fund, United States Institute of Peace and 
Fundação Oriente. 
February 2005 
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org 
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